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1 Introduction
A fundamental query in industrial organization and antitrust concerns the impact of mar-
ket structure on consumer surplus. Such analysis can be controversial and challenging in
even fairly simple brick-and-mortar retail environments. One major complication is that the
relevant number of competitors in such markets is often unobserved by the econometrician,
especially in online markets. To the best of our knowledge, there are no ready tools avail-
able to empirically analyze and assess potential competitive effects in such situations. The
absence of such tools or analyses stems, in part, from the fact that (1) online prices display
considerable price dispersion, which substantially complicates predicting the price effects for
a change of market structure; and (2) the number of (potential) competitors in the online
channel is typically an unknown.
This paper represents a first attempt to quantify the competitive effects of changes in the
number of firms in an online market when the number of sellers is unobserved. The model
that we structurally estimate assumes (1) online firms are symmetric, pure-play e-retailers;
(2) the number of (potential) online competitors at any point in time is known to firms but
not to the econometrician; and (3) online buyers may be segmented into two types: price
sensitive “shoppers,” who rely on a price comparison site to find the best deal, and price
insensitive “loyals,” who simply visit their preferred online firm’s website. This benchmark
environment is the standard framework for modeling e-retail competition; see Baye et al.
(2006) for a survey of this literature.
We first present a general model of online price competition that nests standard models
ranging from Varian (1980) to Iyer et al. (2005) as special cases. The model enriches existing
models of online price competition, including Baye and Morgan (2001), by adding two real-
istic features: (1) firms pay platforms for clicks; and (2) not all clicks result in sales. In such
a model, the observed price distribution represents a combination of the realized number
of firms choosing to list on the site together with their realized prices, both of which are
stochastic and depend on the unobserved number of actual competitors. Thus, it is essential
to recover the price distribution conditional on the true number of competitors in order to
estimate the model parameters and conduct competitive analysis. We show that, using the
results from the recent econometric literature on misclassfication (e.g., Hu (2008)), this price
distribution can be nonparametrically identified from the observed number of competitors
and the listed prices. Based on the results of this identification, we present a two-step pro-
cedure to estimate model parameters. A Monte Carlo experiment (see the online Appendix)
demonstrates that our procedure performs well, and that failing to account for the unobserv-
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ability of the potential number of firms can lead to biased estimates of model parameters. As
an application of our methodology, we structurally estimate the model based on UK data for
personal digital assistants (PDAs), and then use these estimates to simulate the competitive
effects for changes in the number of competitors.
Our empirical results indicate that, at least in some instances, competitive effects in online
markets are more similar to those predicted by the simple homogeneous product Bertrand
model than might be expected given the price dispersion observed in (and predicted by
theoretical models of) e-retail markets. However, unlike in Bertrand models, there are also
distributional effects of equilibrium pricing, e.g., if the number of firms decreases from three
to two, the average transaction price paid by price sensitive “shoppers” increases by 6.89
percent, while the average transaction price paid by consumers “loyal” to a particular firm
decreases by 3.19 percent.1
This paper makes two main contributions: (1) to present a methodology for identification
and estimation of online retail markets (or indeed any market characterized by a first-price
all-pay auction) in which the number of competitors/bidders is observed by insiders but
unknown to the econometrician; and (2) to provide some empirical evidence on how consumer
surplus is affected by the potential number of competitors in an e-retail market.
Most closely related to our work is An et al. (2010), which identifies and estimates a model
of first-price auctions where the number of bidders is known to the auction participants but
unobserved by the researcher. The present paper differs from An et al. (2010) in a number
of respects. First, we focus on a completely different pricing environment; they analyze a
standard first-price winner-pay auction, while our environment mirrors that in a first-price
all-pay auction. Second, our application highlights potential distributional effects of changes
in competition in an online rather than auction market. Furthermore, the present paper
enriches the econometric methodology employed in An et al. (2010) by showing that the
method works well for a modest-sized sample even though the estimation involves large
dimensional matrices.2
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we present a general model of
online price competition. In Section 3, we show the nonparametric identification results. In
Section 4, we describe a two-step estimation procedure for the proposed general model. In
Section 5, we present an empirical application of our methodology using UK data for PDAs.
Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains miscellaneous proofs. Monte Carlo evidence
1Armstrong (2008) points out that similar distributional effects are theoretically possible in the context
of consumer protection policy, while Baye (2008) notes that this is a theoretical possibility in antitrust.
2In our setting, the matrix dimension is 10× 10, whereas in An et al. (2010) it is 3× 3.
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and some technical details omitted in the paper are provided as supporting information in
an online Appendix.
2 Model of Online Price Competition
It is by now well established that price dispersion is considerable and ubiquitous in online
markets. Much of the prior empirical literature presumes such dispersion stems from costly
consumer search. This assumption is appropriate in environments where the information
obtained from an initial search query is insufficient to make a buying decision and hence
subsequent investigation is required. For example, a consumer might jump from website
to website, perhaps guided by the results of the search query, paying the associating (im-
plicit) cost to search, and stopping as in standard models of oﬄine search. Hong and Shum
(2006), Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2008), and Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013) use
such a model to derive a family of dispersed price distributions, which they then structurally
estimate to recover the implied distribution of consumer search costs.
While these models are appropriate in environments where it is costly to compare the
prices that different firms charge for their desired product, they seem less appropriate when
the initial search is conducted on a price comparison site (such as Kelkoo, which we examine
in our empirical application). These sites return the all-in prices (including shipping and
VAT) that each seller charges for an identical product. Consumers may readily sort these
results to identify the firm charging the lowest price (or a variety of other criteria). Similar
shopping experiences are available on platforms such as Amazon, where a search query also
provides detailed information of products and a seller’s reputation. In such settings, the
scope of information available just from the initial search query significantly diminishes the
need to visit seller websites (other than to purchase) and hence drastically reduces the implied
search costs.
Search cost models typically assume that consumers are identical except for costs to
search, yet e-retailers spend vast amounts of money on brand marketing. Presumably they
do this because they believe that consumers can be made “sticky”, loyal in the language
of our model, through brand attachment. The model we describe, and which is the basis
for our empirical application, takes these loyalty distinctions seriously, but abstracts from
search costs. In particular, we assume that search costs are zero within the platform (e.g., it is
costless to compare the prices returned at the comparison site), thatN firms are in the market
for a given good (though not necessarily listing at the platform), and that there are N + 1
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distinct consumer segments. N of these segments represent customers loyal to a particular
seller while the last segment consists of consumers holding no loyalties and choosing purely
on the basis of price. Of course, further segmentation is possible. For instance, a richer
model might allow loyalty to multiple firms, perhaps with slight preferences across each.
Taken to extremes, one could have up to 2N unique loyal segments, as well as a segment
that engages in sequential or fixed-sample search across other platforms. While theoretically
possible, such a model is of limited empirical use owing to the data demands required to
separately identify each of the many segments, let alone the other parameters of the model.
Thus, for practical as well as parsimony reasons, we stick to the simpler specification.
To fix ideas, suppose the market consists of a commonly known number of firms (N > 1)
that produce at a constant marginal cost of m ≥ 0. Firms offer identical products for
sale through their individual websites, which may have different characteristics or provide
different types of service. Some consumers, who we call “loyals,” value these services and
purchase by directly visiting the website of their preferred firm. Other consumers, who we
call “shoppers,” care only about price. They first access a price comparison site to obtain a
listing of the prices charged by sellers advertising at the site and click through to the firm
offering the lowest price. If no prices are listed, they visit the website of a randomly selected
firm.3 All consumers have unit demand and a maximal willingness to pay r.
It is widely recognized that conversion rates in online markets are low—only a fraction of
consumers that click on a price at a comparison site follow through by making a purchase.
Loyal consumers may browse at their preferred company website, perhaps in search of new
offerings, but not necessarily with the intention of buying. Shoppers, even after locating the
lowest price offer, may opt not to buy, perhaps because of a bad user experience or because
they were simply looking rather than buying on this particular occasion. To account for
this, we assume that, with probability γ ∈ (0, 1] a consumer actually makes a purchase. At
the price comparison site, γ may be interpreted as the conversion rate, the fraction of clicks
that turn into sales. Finally, we assume a fixed total number of loyals, M , divided evenly
among symmetric competing firms, so each firm attracts M/N loyals. Moreover, there are a
total of S > 0 shoppers.
We now turn to the details of firm behavior. To advertise at the comparison site, a firm
3We assume that shoppers too are loyal in the following sense: They single home to the modeled price
comparison site and do not jump to another site in the event of unsuccessful search. This ensures that the
model also applies to environments with multiple comparison sites. Under this assumption, Proposition 1 in
Baye and Morgan (2001) offers mild conditions that ensure that the posited search strategy by shoppers is
indeed optimal when endogenized.
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must pay an (explicit or implicit) amount φ > 0 to list its price, plus a cost per click (CPC)
of c ≥ 0 each time a consumer clicks on its price advertisement (listing). Thus, firm i’s
strategy consists of a continuous pricing decision (pi) and a zero-one decision to advertise its
price at the comparison site. Let αi denote the probability that firm i chooses to advertise
on the comparison site. A firm that does not advertise its price on the comparison site
avoids paying listing and clickthrough fees, but at the potential cost of failing to attract the
shoppers visiting the comparison site. The parameters of the model are commonly known
by firms.
When platform fees are not too high, one can readily show that there is an active market
for listings at the comparison site. A closed form characterization of both advertising and
pricing is available for the case where firms are symmetric, which we report below. For
this case, we characterize the symmetric equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies of
firms competing in this online environment. Please see the online Appendix (supporting
information) for a proof.
Proposition 1 Suppose that firms are symmetric, and listing and clickthrough fees are not
too high, 0 < φ < S
(
(r −m) γN−1
N
− c) and 0 ≤ c < (r −m) γN−1
N
. Then in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium:
(a) Each firm lists its price on the comparison site with probability
α∗ = 1−
(
φ
S
(
(r −m) γN−1
N
− c)
) 1
N−1
∈ (0, 1)
(b) Conditional on listing a price at the comparison site, a firm’s advertised price may
be viewed as a random draw from
F ∗ (p) =
1
α∗
1−((r − p) γMN + (r−m)γN−Nc(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
S ((p−m) γ − c)
) 1
N−1
 (1)
on [p0, r] , where p0 = m+
1
(Sγ+Mγ)
(
γM
N
(r −m) + (r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ+ Sc
)
∈ (m, r) .
(c) A firm that does not advertise on the comparison site charges a price of pi = r on its
own website.
(d) Each firm earns an expected profit of Epi = (r −m) γM/N + φ
N(1− c(r−m)γ )−1
.
Note that in the case of monopoly (N = 1), the firm’s strategy is to charge r on its own
website but not advertise on the comparison site. The monopolist attracts both loyals and
shoppers to its site and the expected profit is (r −m)γ(M + S).
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Our model above extends the original Baye and Morgan (2001) model to an environment
in which all transactions take place online, and accounts for clickthrough fees as well as
conversion rates that are potentially less than unity. Consistent with the empirical litera-
ture, the model implies that prices listed at the comparison site are necessarily dispersed
in equilibrium, and that the number of firms actually listing prices at the comparison site
on any given date is generally less than the total number of firms in the market, e.g., see
Baye et al. (2006) for a survey of about twenty studies documenting price dispersion of 10
to 50 percent in online markets. This model nests a variety of other models as special cases,
including Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), Iyer and Pazgal (2003), Baye
et al. (2004) , and Iyer et al. (2005). Unlike some of these special cases, our general model is
flexible enough to allow differing competitive effects on consumer surplus. For instance, the
Rosenthal model implies that when there are two or more competitors, average prices paid
by all consumers rise with the number of competing firms.
Under the maintained hypothesis that firms’ listed prices are distributed according to
equation (1), it is, in principle, possible to estimate the underlying parameters of the model.
Unfortunately, data from price comparison sites reveal A, the realized number of firms choos-
ing to list prices at the site at a given time, but not N, the total number of firms in the
market. The model implies that A is a binomially distributed random variable with param-
eters (α,N). The extant literature mostly finesses this problem. For example, Baye et al.
(2004), Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2008), and Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013) use
the number of observed prices as a proxy for N, in effect assuming that N = A. Hong and
Shum (2006) assume that N = +∞ in their identification of price dispersion models. The
problem of the unobservability of N presents econometric challenges, especially when it varies
over time. The next section offers an identification procedure that explicitly accommodates
the unobservability of N .
3 Identification
The model of online price competition in Section 2 is modified from a low-bid auction in
which the firm offering the lowest price secures the price sensitive shoppers when it lists on the
comparison site. Unlike a standard auction, where the payoff to a losing firm is independent
of its bid; in our setting the payoff (i.e. profits from sales to loyals) varies directly with
one’s bid—a more aggressive (i.e. lower) losing bid produces smaller rewards than a less
aggressive losing bid. Thus, the setting may be thought of as a type of reverse first-price
7
all-pay auction. Viewed from this perspective, it is, ex ante, far from clear that estimation
techniques designed for winner-pay auctions will also work for their all-pay cousins. In
this section we show how one can adapt the techniques of econometric analysis built on a
winner-pay auction model to our (all-pay) setting. Specifically, we show that the equilibrium
distribution of prices in Proposition 1 (along with one additional but rather mild condition)
implies the identification conditions for standard auctions pioneered by Hu (2008) and An
et al. (2010).
Following these authors, suppose the maximum number of (potential) firms is K, and is
known to the econometrician. The actual number of firms N ∈ {2, 3, · · · , K}, which may
vary, is common knowledge to the firms but unknown to the econometrician. We preclude
the case of monopoly (N = 1) since the firm only uses its own website and there will be
no data on the comparison site. Nonetheless, once the model parameters (r,m, γ,M, S) are
identified, we can recover the price charged by the monopolist r as well as its expected profit
(r −m)γ(M + S). Let A denote the number of price listings on a given date and pj be the
j-th listed price, j = 1, · · · , A. For reasons that will become clear, consider only dates in
which two or more firms listed prices, i.e, A ≥ 2. As will be shown, identification of price
distribution in equation (1) will not be affected by dropping the observations with A = 1,
whereas recovering probability Pr(N) requires these observations.
We randomly choose a listed price pl, l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , A} from the A prices for each date
for estimation; from the remaining A − 1 prices we choose another one pm, where m ∈
{1, 2, · · · , A} and m 6= l, as our instrumental variable. To accommodate the discreteness
of the potential number of firms, we discretize pm to construct a discretized instrumental
variable Z:
Z =

2 if pm ∈ [p, p(1)],
3 if pm ∈ (p(1), p(2)],
...
K if pm ∈ (p(K−2), p],
where the support of prices, [p, p], is divided into K − 1 intervals by the K − 2 cutoff points:
p < p(1) < p(2) < · · · < p(K−2) < p¯. The choice of the K − 2 cutoff points does not affect our
identification and estimation given Z satisfies a mild condition (Condition 1 below) which is
empirically testable.
From the econometrician’s point of view: (a) N,A, and Z share the same support
{2, ..., K}; (b) r,m, φ, γ,M, and S are unknown parameters; and (c) N is unobservable
or in dispute. In the application that follows, the cost-per-click (c) is data and hence is not
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included in the set of parameters to be estimated. Let θ ≡ (r,m, φ, γ,M, S). Under the
hypothesis that the prices at the comparison site are generated according to F ∗ in equation
(1), we may write the underlying (undiscretized) distribution of prices as F (p|N ; θ) with
its density being f (p|N ; θ) . To ease the notational burden, we suppress θ whenever there
is no confusion. The lemma below shows that the equilibrium density of listed prices is
independent of A and Z:
Lemma 1 f(p|N) = f(p|A ≥ 2, Z,N).
This result follows directly from the fact that firms’ prices are determined prior to their
knowing realizations of A and Z. Next, notice that, given the data and the model, conditional
on the fact that at least two firms list prices the probability that exactly A firms list at the
comparison site is
g (A|N,A ≥ 2) =
(
N
A
)
(α)A (1− α)N−A
1− (1− α)N −Nα (1− α)N−1 for all 2 ≤ A ≤ N. (2)
It immediately follows that
Lemma 2 g (A|N,A ≥ 2) = g (A|Z,N,A ≥ 2) .
Lemma 1 implies that auxiliary variables A and Z only affect the equilibrium density
of prices through the unobservable number of firms, N . Analogously, Lemma 2 states that
the instrument Z affects the number of listed prices only through N . To recover the price
distribution f(p|N), we require the existence of two auxiliary variables (A,Z) that satisfy
Lemma 1 and 2, where A is a mis-measured version of N and Z is an instrumental variable
of N . Roughly, because A is a noisy measure of N , the two lemmas require that the noise
is independent of the instrument Z, conditional on N . A good candidate for the instrument
Z is a discretized second price because as shown in proposition 1, a price depends on N
through all the model parameters θ ≡ (r,m, φ, γ,M, S). In general, an instrumental variable
Z would require p ⊥ Z|N and A ⊥ Z|N , and Lemma 1 and 2 provide such an instrument
conditional on A ≥ 2. The use of a second price in the role of the instrument Z also requires
at least two listings per date.4
Let h (p,A, Z|A ≥ 2) denote the observed joint density of p,A and Z given two or more
firms list their prices. Let ψ (N,Z|A ≥ 2) denote the joint density of N and Z conditional on
4Of course, the restriction A ≥ 2 may be relaxed if an instrumental variable other than the second price
is available.
9
A ≥ 2, which is unobserved because N is an unknown to the econometrician. This specifi-
cation allows for the possibility that the true number of firms N might vary across products
and over time without placing parametric restrictions on the data-generating process in this
respect. Now, the law of total probability implies the following relationship between the
observed and latent densities:
h (p,A, Z|A ≥ 2) =
K∑
N=2
f(p|N,A ≥ 2, Z)g(A|N,Z,A ≥ 2)ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2)
=
K∑
N=2
f(p|N)g(A|N,A ≥ 2)ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2), (3)
where the second equality follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. Define:
(Hp,A,Z)i,j = h(p,A = i, Z = j|A ≥ 2)(
GA|N
)
i,k
= g (A = i|N = k,A ≥ 2)
(ΨN,Z)k,j = ψ (N = k, Z = j|A ≥ 2) ,
and the diagonal matrix
Fp|N = diag
(
f(p|N = 2), f(p|N = 3), · · · , f(p|N = K)). (4)
All of these are (K − 1)-dimensional square matrices. Then equation (3) may be written in
matrix notation as:
Hp,A,Z = GA|NFp|NΨN,Z (5)
Next, consider the observed joint density of A and Z. Again, the law of total probability
together with Lemma 2 enables us to obtain
b(A,Z|A ≥ 2) =
K∑
N=2
g(A|N,A ≥ 2)ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2)
or, using matrix notation analogous to that above,
BA,Z = GA|NΨN,Z (6)
Identification requires that the following rank condition to be satisfied:
Condition 1 Rank (BA,Z) = K − 1.
Since both A and Z are observables, Condition 1 is empirically testable from the data.
Equation (6) implies Rank (BA,Z) ≤ min
{
Rank
(
GA|N
)
,Rank (ΨN,Z)
}
. Considering that
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all the three matrices are of dimension (K − 1) × (K − 1), Condition 1 is equivalent to a
restriction that both GA|N and ΨN,Z are of full rank and invertible. The full rank condition
for GA|N imposes no restrictions to our model. This is because GA|N is upper-triangular
by construction (A ≤ N) and a sufficient and necessary condition of full rank is that all
the diagonal elements are nonzero, i.e., Pr(A = k|N = k) > 0, for all k = 2, · · · , K. This
condition requires that for any possible number of potential firms (N), there is a positive
probability that all of them advertise their products on the comparison site and this is
automatically satisfied due to equation (2). The full rank condition of ΨN,Z restricts its
columns to be linearly independent, i.e., there is sufficient variation of the joint probability
Pr(N,Z|A ≥ 2). Roughly, it requires that listed prices (recall that Z is a discretized price)
to vary sufficiently when there are different potential number of firms N in the market. It
is worth noting that the full rankness of BA,Z implies Nt is varying across t. The reasoning
is as follows. If there is no variation in Nt, e.g., Nt = k ∈ {2, · · · , K} for all t then
Rank(GA|N) = 1 since only one column of this matrix is nonzero. Consequently, rank of the
nonzero matrix BA,Z will be one rather than K − 1.
By inverting both sides of equation (6) and multiplying it to equation (5) from right, we
obtain our key identifying equation:
Hp,A,Z (BA,Z)
−1 = GA|NFp|N
(
GA|N
)−1
. (7)
The matrix on the left-hand side can be formed from the data. The right-hand side represents
an eigendecomposition (also called spectral decomposition) of the left-hand side matrix since
Fp|N is diagonal (cf. equation (4)). This representation allows us to identify the unknown
matrices Fp|N and GA|N . However, the decomposition must be unique for the purpose of
identification. The uniqueness requires that any two of the eigenvalues are distinct, and the
eigenvector matrix is normalized. Our theoretical model implies:
Lemma 3 The eigendecomposition in equation (7) is unique up to a normalization and
ordering of the columns of the eigenvector matrix GA|N .
For any price p, the matrixHp,A,Z (BA,Z)
−1 has (K−1) eigenvalues, f(p|N = 2), · · · , f(p|N =
K). For a given set of parameters θ, f(p|N) 6= f(p|N ′) holds for any p except on a set of
zero Lebesgue measure, whenever N 6= N ′.5 It then follows that the K−1 eigenvalues of the
5An analytical proof of this statement is tedious due to the complexity of the parametric form for f(p|N) in
(8), and we do not provide a formal proof. Nevertheless, we do not find any counterexamples by numerically
solving f(p|N) = f(p|N ′).
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decomposition in equation (7) are distinct except on a set of zero Lebesgue measure. Hence,
the eigendecomposition is unique up to a normalization and ordering of the columns.
With Lemma 3 in hand, it then follows that an eigendecomposition of the observed
Hp,A,Z (BA,Z)
−1 matrix recovers the unknown Fp|N and GA|N matrices up to a normalization
and ordering of the columns of the eigenvector matrix GA|N . There is a clear, appropriate
choice for the normalization of the eigenvectors because each column of GA|N should add up
to one. The model also implies a natural ordering for the columns of GA|N , since the matrix
is upper-triangular and has non-zero diagonal entries as we discussed before.
Finally, having recovered GA|N , from equation (6) , we have
ΨN,Z =
(
GA|N
)−1
BA,Z
and hence ΨN,Z is also recovered. To summarize, we have shown:
Proposition 2 Suppose Condition 1 holds. Then Fp|N , GA|N and ΨN,Z are identified (with
Fp|N pointwise in p).
The identified joint distribution ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2), i.e., the matrix ΨN,Z needs to be treated
with caution. Consider that ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2) = ψ(N,Z,A≥2)
Pr(A≥2) =
ψ(Z,A≥2|N) Pr(N)
Pr(A≥2) , where both
Pr(A ≥ 2) and ψ(Z,A ≥ 2|N) can be expressed as functions of model parameters but
not for the probability Pr(N). Thus, we consider ψ(N,Z|A ≥ 2) as reduced form in the
identification argument above. The probabilities Pr(N), N = 2, 3, · · · , K might be of interest
for the purpose of some counterfactual analyses. A convenient procedure to identify Pr(N)
is to construct a linear system f(pj) =
∑K
N=2 f(pj|N) Pr(N) where f(p) is the density of
listed prices (including prices for A = 1); pj, j = 1, · · · , K−1 are (K−1) prices and f(pj|N)
is identified in Proposition 2. Pr(N) is then identified as the solution of the linear system if
the matrix constructed by f(pj|N) is full rank. We leave the technical details in Appendix
A. Note that we preclude the case of N = 1. Thus a monopoly firm’s behavior is merely
characterized by the model parameters r,m,M, S, and γ, as we discussed in Section 2.
Upon identifying the price distribution conditional on the “true” number of firms Fp|N ,
the probability distribution Pr(N), and the probability of A firms listing their prices g(A|N),
the structural link between these identified objectives and the parameter θ specified in Propo-
sition 1 allows us to identify θ. First off, the listing probability α∗ for each N can be recovered
from g(A|N). The equilibrium condition that characterizes those firms who advertise a price
r at the comparison site (please see equation (2) in the online Appendix) implies a tradeoff
between the profit (r − m)γ and the cost of listing φ/S per shopper. By varying N , the
profit from shoppers changes, whereas the equilibrium condition holds; this allows us to
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identify (r −m)γ. Consequently, φ/S can be recovered from its relationship with (r −m)γ
at equilibrium. Next, we investigate the dependence of the price distribution Fp|N on θ to
further pin down the parameters. The CDF Fp|N evaluated as a given price p for different N
describes the effects of number of firms on listing prices, and we can identify φ (recall that
(r −m)γ is identified) and (r − p0)γM by varying N . Therefore, S is determined by φ/S.
For a given N , the distribution of price Fp|N evaluated at different prices provides a system
of equations for parameters, which allows us to identify γ, r and M .
Note that the parameters associated with loyals, both their number, M and their will-
ingness to pay r, entirely relies on the functional form in equation (1) owing to the absence
of sales data to estimate these parameters directly. In principle, this reliance on functional
form represents an important limitation to the analysis. Fortunately, our nonparametric
identification procedure offers a test of its validity. Specifically, if the nonparametrically
identified Fp|N agrees with the parametric specification, worries about the dependence of our
identification on functional form is reduced.
It is worth noting that, if the analogs of Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as Condition 1 con-
tinue to hold in some alternative model of price dispersion, then, since our identification is
independent of the functional form of the equilibrium price distribution, the same procedure
may be used to recover the parameters of this alternative model as well.
4 Estimation
We now describe how one may use the identification argument to estimate the structural
model, given data from a price comparison site. Let t = 1, 2, · · · , T index each set of price
observations. For each t, we observe At, the number of firms choosing to list their prices
at the comparison site. Let pit, i = 1, . . . , At denote the At ≥ 2 listed prices at t. Our
estimation procedure accounts for the fact that Nt is known to the competing firms at time
t but is, in effect, a random variable from the perspective of the econometrician. While we
cannot recover the specific value of Nt pertaining to each set of prices at each point in time,
we are able to recover its marginal distribution.
To estimate the vector of parameters θ, we use the following two-step estimation proce-
dure: In the first step, we use our key equation (7) to nonparametrically estimate GA|N and
ΓN , where ΓN is defined as a vector of marginal probabilities over the number of listings N
conditional on A ≥ 2. Our methodology closely parallels the approach taken in An et al.
(2010) and hence we relegate the detailed derivation of these expressions to Appendix B. In
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the second step, based on the parametric form of F (p|N ; θ) in equation (1), we recover the
parameters θ by MLE. Let l (p,A; θ) denote the joint density of prices and number of listings
(A ≥ 2). In equilibrium, A and p are independent conditional on N . Thus, this density may
be written as
l(p,A; θ) =
K∑
N=2
g(A|N,A ≥ 2)f(p|N ; θ)Γ (N) = eAGA|NFp|N ;θΓN ,
where eA = (0, 0, ..., 1, ..., 0) is a row vector where the 1 appears as the A-th element. Hence
the likelihood function Lt for the t-th set of prices is
Lt =
At∏
i=1
l(pit, At; θ) =
At∏
i=1
eAtGAt|NFpit|N ;θΓN .
Using the first step estimates, we can express the likelihood function L as
lnL =
T∑
t=1
At∑
i=1
ln
(
eAtĜAt|NFpit|N ;θΓ̂N
)
.
where Fpit|N ;θ is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element being f (pit|N ; θ) . From equation
(1) , it may be shown that the density associated with F ∗ (p|N ; θ) is given by
f ∗ (p|N ; θ) = 1
N − 1
(
1
α∗
− F ∗ (p|N ; θ)
)(
γM/N
(r − p) γM/N + (r−m)γN−Nc
(r−m)γ(N−1)−Ncφ
+
γ
(p−m) γ − c
)
(8)
for p ∈ [p0, r] and zero otherwise. Note that ĜAt|N and Γ̂N are estimated using the data,
whereas Fpit|N ;θ is based on the theory model.
As a check, we also consider the “na¨ıve” case where the number of potential firms is
simply taken to be the number of actual firms, i.e., N = A. In this case, the likelihood is
lnL =
T∑
t=1
At∑
i=1
ln f(pit|At; θ),where f(p|A; θ) = f ∗ (p|N ; θ) (9)
Notice that we deal with the probability GA|N nonparametrically while its parametric form
(2) is available. The advantage of such an approach is twofold. First, a nonparametric
probability matrix GA|N has the flexibility to incorporate general models of entry. For
example, a tractable parametric form similar to (2) may be difficult to obtain in a model
with endogenous entry while our nonparametric approach may still apply. Second, the
approach provides a specification test of the model, i.e., to test the difference between the
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parametric and nonparametric version of GA|N , where the former matrix can be computed
using the estimate of parameters and the latter is nonparametrically estimated in the first
step. Similarly, the parametric specification of the equilibrium price distribution F (p|N) in
(1) can also be tested.
We present some Monte Carlo evidence in the online Appendix (supporting information)
to demonstrate that our estimation procedure performs well in a controlled, small-sample
environment. Moreover, we also show that failing to account for the unobservability of the
potential number of firms can lead to biased estimates of model parameters.
5 Empirical Application
In this section, we apply our methodology to daily price data obtained from the UK price
comparison site, Kelkoo, during the 18 September 2003 through 6 January 2004 period.
Baye et al. (2009) use these data along with proprietary data on clicks to demonstrate that
behavior at the site is consistent with a “clearinghouse” model that is nested as a special
case of our formulation in Section 2. The goal of this section is to use the econometric
procedure described above to structurally estimate parameters of the model, using only
(publicly available) price data rather than both price and clicks data. Before proceeding, we
briefly explain why the model in Section 2 more closely matches the shopping environment
at Kelkoo than alternative models of online price dispersion, such as models with costly
consumer search. Our discussion summarizes key points in Baye et al. (2009); the interested
reader may refer to that paper for a more detailed description of the shopping environment
at Kelkoo.
At the time these data were collected, Kelkoo was the largest price listing service in the
world, operating in nine other European countries besides the UK. Within the UK, Kelkoo
was the third largest retail website, with over 1,800 participating retailers including 18 of
the largest 20 online retailers in the UK. It attracted an average of 10 million individual
users per month, more than twice that of its closest rival. With a simple keyword search
(e.g., “Compaq iPaq H3630”), a consumer visiting the site during 2003 obtained a complete
list of the prices that different sellers listing on Kelkoo charged for the exact same product.
Information about shipping and VAT were also displayed, such that it was virtually costless
for a shopper to identify the seller charging the lowest “all in” price. By simply clicking the
name of the firm offering the lowest price, the consumer was directed to the checkout page
of the firm’s website to purchase the product.
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For these reasons, the Kelkoo environment of 2003 shares many of the key features of the
idealized environment modeled in Section 2. Its dominant size, depth of participation, and
ease of use meant there were few realistic alternative platforms for search by price conscious
UK shoppers. UK branding activities at the time were no less sophisticated than those in
the US; thus, it seems realistic to suppose that many consumers were loyal to one of the
competing retail brands, which included such UK giants as Tesco and Dixon’s, located on
virtually every High Street in the country. Of course, a fringe of consumers no doubt pursued
other search strategies or were loyal to no firm in particular, but such consumers were unlikely
to be of a size so as to undo the main economic forces driving the model and, presumably,
real world firm decisions by competitors in the consumer electronics retail market. In any
event, the price to be paid for the ability to recover deep parameters via structural estimation
is commitment to a model that, like all models, is necessarily an imperfect representation of
the rich tapestry comprising the actual real world setting.
5.1 Data and Empirical Issues
The estimation dataset, which is fully described in Baye et al. (2009), includes 6151 daily
listed prices (inclusive of taxes and shipping) charged by firms selling 18 models of PDAs
over the period from 18 September 2003 through 6 January 2004. Given the theory model
and shopping environment at Kelkoo, one empirical approach would be to produce separate
estimates for each of these 18 different PDAs. Unfortunately, we have a limited number of
observations for each product and therefore pool data across different PDAs. Fortunately,
this problem is common in the literature (see Hong and Shum (2006), Moraga-Gonza´lez and
Wildenbeest (2008), as well as Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013)), and we may use standard
techniques to overcome these data limitations. In particular, we utilize information about the
characteristics of each product (e.g., brand, CPU clock, ram capacity, and whether bluetooth
and built-in camera are available) to construct “homogenized prices” that control for product
heterogeneity, where characteristics associated with each model were obtained by merging
the original dataset with information from PDAdb.net, a mobile device database.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our data. We can see that products with high
average prices also have higher standard deviation. This implies products with high value
are subject to a larger price dispersion, which may be caused by product characteristics.
The table indicates that product characteristics, as well as manufacturer and month effects,
contribute to the observed variation of listed prices over time and across different PDAs. This
is more clearly seen in Model 1 of Table 2, which shows the results of a regression of prices on
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the number of listings, characteristics of products, manufacturer and month dummies. As the
results of Model 1 show, controlling for product heterogeneity and seasonal (month) effects,
the number of listing firms continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect on
price. On average, the listed price declines by 10.19 GBP with each additional competing
firm. Second, product characteristics and the specific brand of PDA all influence price. For
example, a built-in camera adds as much as 80 GBP to the price of a PDA. Third, the
average listed price in December (the omitted month) is higher than in September, October
and January at the 5% significance level.
To deal with product heterogeneities, we pool the data and construct homogenized prices
by regressing price on the product characteristics and brand fixed effects (Model 2 in Table
2) and then construct “homogenized” prices using the regression results. These homogenized
prices are the basis for our structural estimation.6 Ideally, we may take into account the
product heterogeneity in our analysis by two alternative ways. First, we condition the
estimation on the heterogeneity. This requires a large sample size and is not plausible for our
application due to the limitation of data. Second, we employ a structural method that allows
the model parameters r,m, S and M to depend on the characteristics. The dependence may
be due to firms’ asymmetry in size, reputation, etc. However, such a generalization comes
at the cost of extending the theoretical model in Section 1 to an asymmetric one, which
requires a different characterization of equilibria as well as a quantitively different argument
of identification. It is still an open question whether such a more sophisticated model could
be identified using the kind of data scenario we consider here.
Homogenized prices control for differences in product characteristics or manufacturer,
but they do not (and cannot) account for the seasonal effects observed in Model 1 of Table
2. A key difficulty stems from the multiple factors impacting price (which increased) during
the holiday season (December). During this time period, there is undoubtedly a demand
shock, though its composition between shoppers (S) and loyals (M) is unclear. As well,
there may be a supply shock (larger N) as some firms enter the market to take advantage
of increased demand. This is consistent with the data, where we observe an average number
of listings of 4.08, 4.68, 5.86, 7.84 and 6.54 during September, October, November, December
and January, respectively. Since we only observe the number of listings A and the average
6Such an approach has been used in literature to control for observed heterogeneity, e.g., see Haile et al.
(2006) and Bajari et al. (2014) among others. The main idea is to express prices as p = Wβ + u, where W
is a vector of characteristics and u ⊥ W . Thus the CDF of prices Fp|W = Pr(Wβ + u ≤ p) = Fu(p−Wβ).
Homogenized prices p−Wβ are then constructed using the residuals when we regress prices on manufacturer
and product characteristics as in Model 2 of Table 2.
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price, we cannot disentangle the impact of the shock on various channels (N,M,S, and so
on) without detailed sales data. Therefore, as a robustness check, we separately estimate
the structural model at the exclusion of December, when a (positive) demand shock is most
likely. As we shall see, the parameter estimates are consistent with the estimates over all
periods.
5.2 Structural Estimation
We now estimate the model parameters θ by applying the two-step estimation procedure
to the homogenized data. Our estimation is based on clickthrough fees at Kelkoo in 2003,
which were 20 pence per click or c = 0.20. Out of 1, 591 product-dates available, 1229 had
two or more firms listed prices.
In constructing the GA|N matrix, we collapse observations where there are 10 or more
listings into a single bin owing to a paucity of data. Such pooling may be justified theoret-
ically (see Baye and Morgan (2009)) as well as on the practical grounds that the estimates
in our simulation were relatively invariant to the cutoff used for pooling. Correspondingly,
both A and N take on ten distinct values from {2, 3, ..., 10,11+}. We use a discretized second
listed price as the instrument Z, which also has the same support. Hence, GA|N is a 10× 10
matrix for purposes of estimation, with the first 9 columns corresponding to N = 2, ...10 and
the last bin corresponding to N > 10.
In estimating the matrix of conditional probabilities, GA|N , two potential problems must
be overcome. The first concerns the structure of the matrices comprising equation (7) , used
in the first step of estimation. Since A ≤ N, it then follows that the matrix comprising
the right-hand side of this equation should be upper triangular (as there is no chance of
more listings than competing firms). Consequently, so too should the left-hand side matrix,
HEp,A,ZB
−1
A,Z , but this latter matrix is formed using the data and so may not be upper
triangular. Fortunately, this is of no consequence since, performing the first step of the
estimation without constraining the data in any way, while constraining the estimated matrix
ĜA|N to be upper-triangular in the second step of estimation, does no harm to the asymptotic
consistency or convergence of ĜA|N . The reason, as argued in An et al. (2010), is that
HEp,N,ZB
−1
A,Z must be upper-triangular asymptotically.
The second key hurdle concerns the non-negativity of the elements of ĜA|N . Our main
procedure does not constrain these estimates to be non-negative and indeed, in some cases,
negative values do arise. This too may be overcome by adopting an alternative estimation
procedure where we impose non-negativity constraints to all elements of ĜA|N and choose
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values to minimize the distance between the left and right-hand sides of equation (7) rather
than solving it explicitly from the decomposition. It is routine to show that this alternative
procedure retains the asymptotic consistency and convergence properties of the original esti-
mation procedure. We opted to compute ĜA|N both with and without imposing constraints
and derived similar estimates. The reported estimates derive from the constrained version
of ĜA|N .
5.3 Estimation Results and Discussions
Table 3 reports the results of the first-stage estimates of the matrix GA|N . The element
ĜA=i|N=j(j ≥ i) corresponds to the estimated probability (in the data used) that there are
A firms listing prices on the comparison site when the population of firms is N . According
to the discussion on the full rankness of BA,Z in Section 3, this result also implies that there
are sufficient variation of N across time.
The resulting parameter estimates, along with bootstrapped standard errors, are reported
in Table 4, where columns (a) and (b) are obtained under different ways of pooling the larger
values of A. For comparison, we also provide in column (c) the “Na¨ıve” estimates which
assume N = A and ignore the potential unobservability of the number of potential firms.
The monetary parameters (r,m and φ) are denominated in GBP. As the table reveals, all of
the parameters are precisely estimated by our two-step procedure.
The parameter estimates in column (a) of Table 4 indicate that, on an average day in
the UK during 2003, a total of M = 25.84 loyal consumers were interested in purchasing a
PDA online, while S = 12.75 consumers were interested in purchasing online from the firm
charging the lowest price. These estimates imply that about 33 percent of consumers in this
online market are price-sensitive shoppers, while 67 percent are loyals. It is interesting to
contrast our estimates with those of Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), who find that around
13% of consumers in US e-retail markets were shoppers during that time period. Given
the somewhat less-developed state of e-retail in the UK compared to the US in 2003, it
is not altogether surprising to find that fewer UK customers had become “attached” to a
particular online retailer. The estimated conversion rate, γ = .08, implies that a firm listing
on Kelkoo.com had to receive, on average, about 12 clicks in order to generate one sale. At a
cost of 20 pence per click, this translates into an average cost per sale of 2.4 GBP in addition
to the fixed listing fee of φ = 4.82 GBP. Finally, notice that the estimated monopoly markup
for a PDA, (r −m) /r, is about 80 percent.7
7This is the monopoly markup of the “homogenized price”. As shown in column (h) of Table 5, the profit
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Consistent with our simulation (see the online Appendix), the results in column (c) also
show that the na¨ıve approach yields parameter estimates that substantially understate the
level of e-retail competition, compared to our estimates that account for the unobservability
of N . This is most clearly seen from columns (g) and (h) in Table 5, which report the
expected profit for each firm using the estimates in Columns (a) and (c) of Table 4 and the
formula in Proposition 1. For each N , the expected profit using the na¨ıve approach almost
doubles those based on our estimates.
We also present several robustness checks to address concerns that our results may be
sensitive to accounting for seasonal demand shocks, pooling data for large N, or employing
different instruments and methods of discretization. These checks reveal that our findings
are robust to these potential concerns. The results in column (f) of Table 4 deal with
seasonality issues by using data at the exclusion of December 2003. If interaction effects from
time varying demand were distorting our results, we would expect wildly varying estimates
compared to those reported in column (a) based on all the data. Comparing the two sets
of results we see, as expected, an increase in the number of shoppers and loyals, but little
change in the other parameters, thus mitigating concerns about results being driven by a
failure to account for demand shocks. Similarly, columns (d) and (e) of Table 4 permit
one to compare results based on pooling observations with 11 or more listings (column (a))
with those arising by pooling observations with 8 or more listings. The estimates do not
vary substantially with the method of pooling. Finally, we varied the construction of Z as
well. Specifically, we chose alternative observed prices as the instrument Z and also used
different methods of discretization. These variations did not materially impact our parameter
estimates. Indeed, provided the rank condition Rank(BA,Z) = K − 1 holds, the estimates
are similar to those in columns (d) and (e) of Table 4, and quite robust to variation in
discretization. Overall, these estimates suggest that the potential concerns we highlighted
earlier do not materially impact our parameter estimates.
We conclude this section by examining the goodness-of-fit of our parametric specification
of the price distribution F (p|N) in Proposition 1.8 In particular, we compare the non-
parametrically estimated F̂ (p|N) in the first step with the one obtained by plugging θˆ into
equation (1), i.e, F (p|N ; θˆ). For all N ∈ {2, 3, ..., 10, 10+}, the parametric distribution of
of non-monopoly retailers is much smaller.
8An alternative goodness-of-fit test for specification involves the probability g(A|N); one may use the Chi-
Square diagnostic tests proposed in Andrews (1988a,b) to test the difference between the nonparametrically
estimated ĝ(A|N) and the parametric one g(A|N ; θˆ). Nevertheless, we focus on F (p|N) since it incorporates
the parametric specification of the listing probability, α∗.
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price, F (p|N ; θˆ) is contained in the 95% point-wise confidence band (estimated by boot-
strapping 200 times) of F̂ (p|N). Figure 1 illustrates the result for the case where N = 8,
and is typical of the patterns for other N . In the figure, the solid and dotted lines represent
F (p|N ; θˆ) and the mean of F̂ (p|N), respectively, and the confidence band consists of two
dash lines. An important caveat to this comparison is that, due to the small sample size,
the confidence band around F̂ (p|N) is fairly wide, so having F (p|N ; θˆ) lie inside this band
is not a stringent test.
5.4 The Effects of Changes in Market Structure
The econometric framework described above, along with the structural estimates of the
model of online price competition, permit us to address a number of issues that arise in the
evaluation of the competitive effects when the number of online firms changes.
To accomplish this, we first substitute the parameter estimates reported in column (a)
of Table 4 into the expressions summarizing equilibrium behavior in Proposition 1. We
use carets to denote the resulting estimates. Next, we calculate the implied average prices
conditional on a given number of firms and display them in Table 5. Column (a) in Table
5 lists the total number of firms in the relevant market (N), which is unknown. Column
(b) provides the estimated average price listed at the comparison site conditional on dif-
ferent numbers of competitors, where the average listed price is E [p] =
∫ r̂
p̂0
pdF̂ ∗ (p). As
expected, Table 5 shows that the estimated average listed price declines in the number of
firms—rather abruptly as one moves from monopoly to a duopoly, and modestly there-
after. Column (c) reports the estimated average minimum listed price, which is given by
E [pmin] =
1
1−(1−α̂∗)N
∑N
A=1
(
N
A
)
α̂∗
A
(1− α̂∗)N−A ∫ r̂
p̂0
pA[1− F̂ ∗ (p)]A−1dF̂ ∗ (p) . Notice that this
calculation takes into account the effect of a change in N on the equilibrium distribution
of prices, firms’ propensities to advertise prices at the comparison site, and the impact of a
larger number of listings on the minimum order statistic. Accounting for this, Column (c) of
Table 5 shows that the estimated average minimum listed price also declines as the number
of firms increases.
Note that in our setting neither the average prices nor the average minimum prices
represent average transaction prices. To calculate the average transaction price paid by
loyals, one needs to account for a firm’s propensity to list prices on the comparison site. When
a firm chooses not to list, the model implies that it charges the monopoly price, but this
price is unobservable to us. Thus, the average transaction price paid by a loyal customer is
E
[
pL
]
= α̂∗E [p]+(1−α̂∗)r̂. Column (d) of Table 5 reports the estimated average transaction
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prices of loyal consumers. Notice that it declines abruptly as one moves from monopoly
to duopoly, but then rises as the number of firms increases further.9 Likewise, the average
transaction price for shoppers must also account for listing decisions: The average transaction
price paid by a price-sensitive shopper is given by E
[
pS
]
= [1−(1−α̂∗)N ]E [pmin]+(1−α̂∗)N r̂.
Column (e) of Table 5 reports the estimated average transaction price of shoppers, which
declines as the number of firms increases.10
Columns (d) and (e) highlight that shoppers and loyals are impacted differently by height-
ened competition: So long as there are at least two firms in the market, loyal consumers
are harmed by heightened competition, while shoppers are unambiguously made better off.
The overall transaction price, reported in Column (f) of Table 5, is merely an average of the
shoppers’ and loyals’ estimated transaction prices, weighted by the estimated fraction of are
shoppers vs. loyals: E
[
pT
]
= M̂
Ŝ+M̂
E
[
pL
]
+ Ŝ
Ŝ+M̂
E
[
pS
]
. The first row of columns (b)-(f)
presents the price charged by a monopolist, (r −m)γ(M + S).
In summary, the estimates in Table 5 reveal that the average listed price and the average
minimum listed price both decline as the number of firms increases. This is consistent
with standard reasoning, which suggests that heightened competition leads to lower prices.
However, this ignores the endogenous listing decisions of firms, which is, of course, relevant for
the transaction prices paid by consumers. Here, a more subtle story emerges. Both shoppers
and loyals pay lower average transaction prices as the online market moves from monopoly
to duopoly. Thereafter, the effects of increased competition diverge: Loyal consumers are
harmed (pay higher average transaction prices) as the number of firms further increases,
while shoppers benefit from heightened competition. Intuitively, as the number of firms
increases, the minimum listed price decreases due to competition, so does the profit of a
firm earns from the comparison website. This results in a smaller listing probability for a
9That the transactions price increasing for loyals as competition increases is not purely an artifact of our
two consumer type model. In fact, the result readily extends to situations where some of the loyals for each
firm are only partially loyal (“quasi-loyals”) in the sense that they also search at a second firm. To see this,
let ε denote the fraction of “quasi-loyals” in the population. If the proportion of loyals 1 − ε is sufficiently
large, the effects of competition on loyals remains under this alternative model.
10There is an apparent discrepancy between the predictions as to average transaction prices on the com-
parison site, which are falling in N (and hence also in A because the two are positively correlated) and our
reported average transaction prices offered in Table 1, which are not strictly monotone in A. The difference
stems from the fact that the measure contained in the summary statistics does not account for instances
where shoppers buy without using the comparison site because of the lack of listings. These events are more
likely when N (and hence A) is small than when it is large; thus, the summary statistics understate actual
transactions prices, though to a lessening degree as A increases.
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larger number of firms (using the estimate of column (a) in Table 4, we can verify that α
is decreasing in N). Thus for a larger N , loyal consumers pay the monopoly price r and
the average listed price E[p] with a larger and smaller probability, respectively, and this
may lead to an increasing average transaction price. Similarly, shoppers also pay r with
an increasing probability (1 − α∗)N and the average minimum listed price E[pmin] with a
decreasing probability for a larger N . However, since the probability (1 − α∗)N is much
smaller than [1 − (1 − α∗)N ], the decreasing E[pmin] dominates shoppers’ payment as N
increases. Thus shoppers benefit from heightened competition by paying less.
Table 6 uses the results in Table 5 to compute the price effects when the number of
firms declines from N to N − 1, where column (a) represents the post-decline number of
firms. So long as there is more than one firm in the market, a change of market structure
will not harm the “average” online consumer. This conclusion is based on the assumption
that firms in the online channel do not compete against firms in other channels. In effect,
column (f) reveals that—even though models of online competition are more complex than
standard homogenous product Bertrand competition and the “law of one price” does not
hold online—the conclusions based on our estimates are similar to what one would have
concluded based on the simple Bertrand model, at least in this particular online market:
There are no adverse effects from a consolidation in market structure in this online market
so long as there are two firms in the market.
It is interesting to compare our results above with a Bertrand competition model without
segmentation where all the M + S consumers are shoppers (if all the consumers are loyal,
each firm charge r on its own site). In such a model, a monopoly firm (N = 1) charges r
on its own website. Once N > 1, a firm without advertising its product on the comparison
website attracts no shoppers and earns zero profit. On the other hand, due to Bertrand
competition, firms list on the comparison site charge a uniform price, which is the sum of
marginal cost, listing and click cost. Therefore, similar to our model, if there is more than
one firm in the market, a change of market structure will benefit the consumers.
We may also compute the competitive effects using the na¨ıve estimates in Table 4. The
results show that one may underestimate competitive effects by failing to account for the
unobserved number of potential firms in the market. For example, if the number of firms
decreases from three to two, our estimates indicate that the average transaction price paid
by price sensitive “shoppers” and “loyals” increases by 6.89%, and declines by 3.19%, re-
spectively. Using the na¨ıve estimates results in smaller predicted price effects (12% smaller
for “shoppers” and 15% smaller for “loyals”).
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6 Conclusions
We showed that the econometric methodology from winner-pay auctions may be used to
identify and structurally estimate standard models of online competition, even when the
number of competing firms is unobserved. The estimates can be employed to analyze the
competitive effects induced by the change of number of firms. Our empirical results suggest
that: (1) Online markets are less vulnerable to adverse competitive effects from reductions
in the number of firms than one might expect given the plethora of papers documenting
significant price dispersion in online markets; (2) reductions in the number of competitors in
online retail markets harm price sensitive shoppers but benefit customers who are loyal to
a particular firm; and (3) using the observed number of firms as a proxy for the number of
potential firms may lead to estimates that significantly understate the degree of competition
in online markets. We stress, however, that these findings are based on data from one e-
retail market in the UK and a particular structural model that we believe fits that market
environment. While the model and econometric techniques developed in this paper are
useful more generally, one should tread cautiously in generalizing the results from our study
to environments where search costs play an important role in determining equilibrium prices.
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A Identification of Pr(N)
In this section, we discuss the identification of Pr(N), the probability distribution of number
of firms, N . We first construct a linear system f(pj) =
∑K
N=2 f(pj|N) Pr(N), where f(p) is
the density of listed prices including A = 1. pj, j = 1, 2, · · · , K − 1 are (K − 1) prices and
f(pj|N) is identified in Proposition 2. For ease of exposition, we rewrite the linear system
as a matrix equation
Φp,NΣN = P, (10)
where the matrix Φp,N is defined as (Φp,N)j,k = f(p = pj|N = k). ΣN denote the vector of
the unknown frequency distribution of N , ΣN ≡
(
Pr(N = 2),Pr(N = 3), · · · ,Pr(N = K))T
and P is the vector of K − 1 prices, P ≡ (f(p1), f(p2), · · · , f(pK−1))T . The vector ΣN is
uniquely determined by the linear system if the following full rank condition holds:
Condition 2 There exist K − 1 prices, p1, p2, · · · pK−1 such that Rank (Φp,N) = K − 1.
Note that Condition 2 is testable because f(p|N) is identified in Proposition 2 and the matrix
Φp,N is observable once the choice of the K − 1 prices is given. Under Condition 2, all the
elements of the vector ΣN are uniquely solved from the linear system using Cramer’s rule.
We summarize the results above in the following corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Suppose Conditions 1-2 hold. The probability distribution of N is identified
for N = 2, 3, · · · , K.
B Estimation: The First Step
In this section, we describe how to use observable data on prices (p) and the number of
listing firms (A) to estimate GA|N and the probability distribution ΓN using the data with
A ≥ 2. We suppress the condition A ≥ 2 whenever there is no ambiguity. Our methodology
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closely parallels the approach taken in An, Hu and Shum (2010). While the key identification
equation (3) is stated in terms of the joint density h (p,A, Z) , faster convergence is achieved
if instead we take the expectation over all prices given (A,Z) . Specifically, let E[p|A,Z] =∫
ph(p,A,Z)
b(A,Z)
dp, i.e. the expected price conditional on some realization A, Z. It then follows
from equation (7) that
E [p|A,Z] b (A,Z) =
K∑
N=2
E [p|N ]× g(A|N)ψ(N,Z)
where E[p|N ] = ∫ pf (p|N) dp.
Now define the matrices:
HEp,N,Z ≡ [E (p|A = i, Z = j) b(A = i, Z = j)]i,j , (11)
and
FEp|N ≡ diag (E[p|N = 2], · · · , E[p|N = K]) .
Then, we have
HEp,A,Z = GA|NFEp|NΨN,Z
which is analogous to equation (5) . Similarly, we can obtain the estimating equation by
postmultiplying both sides of this equation by B−1A,Z . This yields the analogous identification
equation:
HEp,A,Z (BA,Z)
−1 = GA|NFEp|N
(
GA|N
)−1
(12)
Consequently,
GA|N = ζ
(
HEp,A,Z (BA,Z)
−1) ,
where ζ (·) denotes the mapping from a square matrix to its eigenvector matrix. Note that
if the distribution of listed prices is such that the average price is monotonically ordered in
N , then an analog of Lemma 3 holds for expected prices as well. This guarantees that ζ is a
unique mapping. Following Hu (2008), we may estimate the relevant matrices using sample
averages:
ĜA|N ≡ ζ
(
ĤEp,A,Z
(
B̂A,Z
)−1)
, (13)
where
ĤEp,A,Z =
 1
T
∑
t
1
Aj
Aj∑
i=1
pit1(At = Aj, Zt = Zk)

j,k
. (14)
In general, Z can be obtained by different choices of discretization, and this may result in
different matrices Hp,A,Z , and ΨN,Z . However, both the main identification equation (8) and
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Proposition 2 hold for those methods of discretization such that Condition 1 holds. Our
procedure of identification and estimation are based on the main identification equation (8),
which is pointwise in p, a continuous variable. Therefore, we are still dealing with continuous
price and discretization will have no impact on our estimation results.
Finally, let g (A) be a vector of marginal probabilities over the number of listings and
let ΓN denote the vector of the unknown frequency distribution of N conditional on A ≥ 2.
Then
g (A) = GA|NΓN
and we may estimate the unknown distribution ΓN using the data as follows:
Γ̂N =
(
ĜA|N
)−1
gˆ (A) (15)
where gˆ (A) denotes the empirical frequency of the number of listings.
Finally, we propose a least square estimate for ΣN according to the linear system equation
(10) on Corollary 1. Without taking average with respect to price p, the eigen-decomposition
in the preceding step can be used to estimate the conditional density f(p|N). Let fˆ(p|N)
denote the estimate, then we have a linear system fˆ(pit) =
∑K
N=2 fˆ(pit|N) Pr(N), where fˆ(·)
is a kernel density estimate. The probabilities Pr(N) then are estimated using a least square
estimator. It is worth noting that we use all the observation including those A = 1 in this
step of estimation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable # of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
# of listings
1 362 323.10 121.64 141.56 607.77
2 714 315.21 142.51 108.1 607.77
3 465 303.24 126.43 108.1 607.77
4 644 300.12 94.50 133.77 607.77
5 705 287.30 91.65 132.75 499
6 660 320.87 92.22 133.77 509.29
7 791 315.87 90.16 183.94 509.29
8 608 319.98 104.19 179.99 509.29
9 315 306.89 103.63 179.99 509.29
10 350 327.41 115.16 179.99 509.29
11 297 307.68 106.19 179.99 509.29
12 132 256.49 35.26 183.94 329.71
13 65 271.48 26.75 244.95 329.71
14 28 272.29 26.22 244.95 329.71
15 15 272.83 24.75 244.95 323.89
Month
Sep.2003 655 303.75 103.42 108.1 529.94
Oct.2003 1781 305.62 108.23 108.1 599
Nov.2003 1764 314.29 109.28 110.45 607.77
Dec.2003 1674 309.48 104.91 134.88 596.98
Jan.2004 277 307.43 104.62 141.56 596.98
Product∗
e740wi (Toshiba) 216 434.12 90.11 251.46 491.57
h1910 (HP) 171 223.83 30.54 169.49 309.98
h1940 (HP) 898 275.45 23.13 240.88 331.69
h2210 (HP) 184 332.26 26.22 295.98 374.83
h3950 (HP) 91 291.06 21.18 273.77 377.11
h3970 (HP) 131 328.30 25.94 298.74 415.07
h5550 (HP) 851 464.96 27.14 427.98 509.29
m515 (Palm) 44 198.85 19.79 166.98 219.00
nx70v (Sony) 164 291.22 61.02 234.42 379.00
nx73v (Sony) 501 379.66 28.58 338.94 446.45
nz90 (Sony) 151 541.47 34.57 499.95 607.77
sj22 (Sony) 368 151.62 16.02 132.75 183.94
sj33 (Sony) 44 173.89 5.85 168.29 179.95
tg50 (Sony) 428 272.55 20.09 203.94 309.54
treo90 (Handspring) 136 132.02 22.56 108.10 156.17
tungstent2 (Palm) 678 265.82 30.14 202.39 327.03
tungstenw (Palm) 295 406.17 42.08 376.98 499.00
zire71 (Palm) 800 210.73 15.76 179.99 253.94
Total 6,151 309.04 107.01 108.1 607.77
# of listings 6,151 5.90 3.07 1 15
Characteristics
CPU speed (MHz) 6,151 220.23 120.47 33 400
RAM (MB) 6,151 46.45 38.34 16 128
Bluetooth 6,151 .55 .49 0 1
Built-in Camera 6,151 .31 .46 0 1
∗ A product is indicated by both its model and the brand (in parentheses), e.g., e740wi is produced by Toshiba.
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Table 2: Reduced form analysis
Model 1 Model 2
Number of listings -10.19∗∗∗
(0.40)
Processor (MHZ) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Ram (GB) 2.57∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.062)
Bluetooth 55.18∗∗∗ 28.70∗∗∗
(3.68) (3.70)
Camera 78.86∗∗∗ 50.17∗∗∗
(4.08) (4.10)
HP -102.47∗∗∗ -116.95∗∗∗
(4.41) (4.60)
Sony 24.58∗∗∗ 41.76∗∗∗
(2.67) (2.72)
Toshiba& Handspring -61.68∗∗∗ -34.74∗∗∗
(5.13) (5.28)
September -27.53∗∗∗
(3.50)
October -15.0∗∗∗
(2.63)
November -3.98
(2.48)
January -11.50∗∗
(4.56)
Constant 201.5∗∗∗ 142.88∗∗∗
(3.98) (2.71)
N 6151 6151
R2 0.575 0.528
adj. R2 0.574 0.528
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Estimated GA|N Matrix
Number of firms (N)
Number of listings(A) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > 10
2 1.00 0.56 0.66 0.40 0.31 0.16 0.42 0.63 0.49 0.35
3 0 0.44 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.13
4 0 0 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.08
5 0 0 0 0.28 0.28 0.53 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.09
6 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.16
7 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.09
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.02 0.05
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.02
> 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02
Table 4: Parameter Estimates and Robustness Check
Estimate Robustness Check
Params.
Two-step
estimate
(a)
Two-step
estimate
(b)
“Na¨ıve”
estimate
(c)
Discretization
# 1
(d)
Discretization
# 2
(e)
Exclude
December
(f)
φ 4.82 4.77 3.02 4.91 4.92 4.01
(0.45) (0.30) (0.22) (0.68) (0.81) (0.78)
r 452.75 452.76 319.49 466.18 445.37 426.78
(32.87) (25.12) (23.43) (56.21) (76.34) (65.34)
m 86.34 82.46 94.29 83.47 80.27 82.12
(25.08) (14.39) (17.09) (26.55) (28.19) (34.12)
M 25.84 23.82 35.36 27.81 25.20 29.13
(9.75) (14.10) (12.92) (8.10) (11.12) (8.66)
S 12.75 11.88 22.59 9.56 10.09 14.32
(1.91) (1.82) (2.02) (1.23) (2.65) (2.42)
γ 0.076 0.069 0.14 0.065 0.069 0.077
(0.013) (0.0084) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Note: Column (d) contains the estimates when we pool observations with 8 or more listings, and column (e) reports the
results when we choose different price to be discretized to get Z. Specifically, the cutoff points are
the 9th, 19th, 30th, 38th, 46th, 60th, 70th, 80th, and 95th percentile of the chosen price.
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Figure 1: Price Distributions
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Table 5: Estimated Transaction Prices and Profit
Prices Profit
Number of
Firms
Avg.
Listed
Price
Avg.
Minimum
Listed Price
Avg.
Trans. Price
Loyals
Avg.
Trans. Price
Shoppers
Avg.
Trans. Price
“Na¨ıve”
Profit
Two-step
Profit
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1 452.75 452.75 452.75 452.75 452.75 1827.05 1074.62
2 345.85 319.31 348.80 319.41 339.09 560.47 364.68
3 344.38 296.95 359.93 297.41 339.27 373.13 242.29
4 339.16 279.04 369.08 279.87 339.61 279.72 181.51
5 333.22 264.55 376.46 265.72 339.87 223.73 145.13
6 327.39 252.61 382.51 254.06 340.07 186.41 120.90
7 321.89 242.58 387.56 244.27 340.22 159.77 103.61
8 316.79 234.02 391.86 235.91 340.33 139.79 90.64
9 312.06 226.62 395.56 228.69 340.43 124.25 80.56
10 307.69 220.15 398.79 222.37 340.50 111.82 72.50
11 303.63 214.43 401.64 216.79 340.57 101.65 65.90
12 299.85 209.33 404.18 211.81 340.62 93.18 60.41
13 296.33 204.76 406.45 207.35 340.67 86.01 55.76
14 293.04 200.63 408.50 203.32 340.71 79.86 51.77
15 289.95 196.88 410.36 199.66 340.74 74.54 48.32
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Table 6: Percentage Change of Transaction Prices
Number of
Firms
Estimated Change
in Average
Listed Price
Estimated Change
in Avg. Minimum
Listed Price
Estimated Change
in Average
Transaction Price
Loyals
Estimated Change
in Average
Transaction Price
Shoppers
Estimated Change
in Average
Transaction Price
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 23.61% 29.47% 22.96% 29.45% 25.10%
2 0.43% 7.00% -3.19% 6.89% -0.05%
3 1.51% 6.03% -2.54% 5.90% -0.10%
4 1.75% 5.19% -2.00% 5.06% -0.08%
5 1.75% 4.51% -1.61% 4.39% -0.06%
6 1.68% 3.97% -1.32% 3.85% -0.04%
7 1.59% 3.53% -1.11% 3.42% -0.03%
8 1.49% 3.16% -0.95% 3.06% -0.03%
9 1.40% 2.86% -0.82% 2.76% -0.02%
10 1.32% 2.60% -0.71% 2.51% -0.02%
11 1.24% 2.38% -0.63% 2.29% -0.02%
12 1.17% 2.18% -0.56% 2.11% -0.01%
13 1.11% 2.02% -0.50% 1.94% -0.01%
14 1.05% 1.87% -0.46% 1.80% -0.01%
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